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ABSTRACT 
APB 28, Interim Financial Reporting, requires firms to report tax expense each 
quarter based on their estimated annual effective tax rate (ETR); however, due to both 
bias (e.g., downward manipulation) and estimation error, these estimates do not always 
accurately represent annual ETR. I exploit the requirements in APB 28 to examine the 
determinants of tax reporting accuracy and the effect of prior tax reporting accuracy on 
investor reaction to reported tax expense. Consistent with a monitoring role over 
financial reporting, I find that analyst following, institutional ownership, and auditor 
tenure are positively associated with interim tax reporting accuracy. I also document 
several firm characteristics that are negatively associated with interim tax reporting 
accuracy but have no association with bias, suggesting that these factors significantly 
contribute to estimation error within the tax accounts. Importantly, I find that estimated 
taxable income is more informative to investors as a performance measure for firms that 
have been more accurate in prior years, and that investors respond more positively to 
beating analysts’ forecasts using a decrease in the tax rate when the firm has a record of 
accurate tax reporting.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Information in accounting earnings results in increased trading volume, stock 
price volatility, and abnormal stock returns, consistent with accounting earnings 
providing useful information to investors (Beaver 1968; Ball and Brown 1968). 
However, certain characteristics make financial information more or less useful. FASB 
Concepts Statement No. 8 states, “If the level of uncertainty in [an estimate] is 
sufficiently large, that estimate will not be particularly useful.” One such estimate that is 
material for a broad set of firms is the estimated GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) reported 
during interim periods (Dhaliwal et al. 2004). Prior studies have examined the potential 
bias of interim ETR estimates (Comprix et al. 2012); however, due to the complexity of 
the tax accounts these estimates also contain significant estimation error, resulting in 
inaccurate estimates. Although the tax accounts are one of the most complex areas of 
financial reporting (Graham et al. 2012) and are among the most restated accounts 
(Deloitte 2011; Whalen and Usvyatsky 2014), suggesting taxes are not always accurately 
reported, we currently know little about the determinants of tax reporting accuracy and 
whether it is important to investors. In this study, I examine three factors that may 
contribute to interim tax reporting accuracy: 1) complexity in the tax estimation process, 
2) the role of institutional investors and financial analysts, and 3) characteristics of the 
auditor. I further examine whether investor response to reported tax expense varies with 
prior tax reporting accuracy.  
 I define interim tax reporting accuracy as the precision with which reported 
interim ETRs predict the annual ETR. ASC 740-270-30 states, “At the end of each 
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interim period the company should make its best estimate of the effective tax rate 
expected to be applicable for the full fiscal year.”  Therefore, the ETR reported in each 
quarter is management’s best estimate of annual ETR. However, because there is 
significant complexity, judgment, and uncertainty involved in reporting tax expense 
(Graham et al. 2012), there is likely significant estimation error in the tax accounts.1 
Despite numerous studies that acknowledge the difficulty and uncertainty surrounding 
tax reporting, the determinants and consequences of tax reporting accuracy have not 
been examined comprehensively in prior academic work.2 
 It is important to examine the determinants of interim tax reporting accuracy for 
at least four reasons. First, changes in tax rates can be substantial in magnitude, thereby 
producing significant changes in reported after-tax earnings. For example, Comprix et al. 
(2012, page 41) report that the standard deviation of changes of estimated ETRs from 
first to second, second to third, and third to fourth quarter are 6.0, 6.9, and 8.7 percent, 
respectively, in their post-SOX sample. Using the federal statutory tax rate of 35 percent 
as a baseline, these standard deviation changes effectively change after-tax earnings by 
9.2, 10.5, and 13.4 percent, respectively.3  Thus, subsequent correction of ETR estimates 
can have a significant effect on after-tax earnings.  
                                                 
1 Because firms are required to project ETR for the annual period, this definition of accuracy includes 
unforeseen changes in the firms’ operating environment and forecast error; this component adds to the 
difficulty of providing accurate ETR estimates during interim periods.  
2 In a related study, Bratten et al. (2016), examine how analysts use and improve upon management ETR 
forecasts; in Section II I discuss similarities and differences between my study and theirs.  
3 For example, the first quarter standard deviation of 6.0 percent changes after-tax earnings by 6.0/(1-0.35) 
= 9.2 percent.  
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 Second, prior academic work suggests that ETR estimates are systematically 
biased and can be manipulated in order to reach after-tax earnings benchmarks (e.g., 
Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Comprix et al. 2012). While these studies focus on the systematic 
decrease of ETRs to manage earnings, they also provide descriptive evidence that many 
firms increase ETRs throughout the year, suggesting significant estimation error in 
addition to bias.4  Because ETR accuracy is a function of both estimation error and bias 
(i.e., both contribute to inaccuracy of ETR estimates), I separate these factors to examine 
estimation error more directly. That is, the factors associated with ETR accuracy (i.e., 
absolute difference between the estimate and year-end ETR) but not ETR bias (i.e., 
systematic signed differences between the estimated and year-end ETR) contribute to 
ETR estimation error (i.e., unbiased errors in ETR reporting). Thus, by examining both 
accuracy and bias I provide insight into factors that contribute to ETR estimation error.  
 Third, ETR changes are important to firm managers. Graham et al. (2014) report 
that 84 percent of tax executives rate the GAAP ETR at least as important as cash taxes 
paid. Further, the Tax Executive Institute (TEI) (2011-2012) Corporate Tax Department 
Survey indicates the most common measurement used to evaluate the tax departments is 
“lack of surprises.”  In my discussions with several Big 4 tax partners, they indicated 
that both earnings increasing and earnings decreasing ETR surprises tend to be viewed 
negatively by investors because they provide signals about the credibility of the tax 
                                                 
4 For example, Bratten et al. (2016) find that quarterly ETR increases occur nearly as frequently as ETR 
decreases; I argue this is due at least in part to estimation error and the difficulty of accurately estimating 
tax expense. 
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department; even an ETR surprise that has a positive effect on earnings could be viewed 
as “lucky” and interested parties may question whether there will be future surprises that 
will have a negative effect on earnings. To the extent that surprises in ETR are revealed 
through inaccurate interim ETR estimates, my study is directly related to one of the most 
important measurements used to evaluate tax departments.  
 Fourth, ETR estimation accuracy could provide a signal regarding the level of 
uncertainty and potential error in the tax accounts and could therefore have significant 
implications for how the market understands and responds to the reported information. 
For example, investors are interested in the persistence of earnings but often 
underweight the persistence of the tax change component of earnings (Schmidt 2006). I 
assert that firms may differ in the reliability of reported ETRs, contributing to the 
difficulty in assessing the persistence of ETR changes and creating heterogeneity in 
users’ response to reported tax expense (i.e., firms with more accurate tax reporting 
likely have stronger reaction due to the increased reliability of the amount reported). 
Consistent with this point, Bratten et al. (2016) find that better information about tax 
expense reduces analysts’ forecast dispersion and could therefore have implications for 
the cost of capital.5   
 I investigate three distinct factors that could be associated with interim tax 
reporting accuracy. First, I examine firm characteristics that may create tax estimation 
                                                 
5 Relatedly, McGuire et al. (2015) provide preliminary evidence that variability in interim ETR estimates 
is associated with lower financial reporting quality, as observed by a higher likelihood of restatements and 
internal control weaknesses.  
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complexity. Prior research suggests that accounting for income taxes (AFIT) is one of 
the most complex areas of financial reporting (Graham et al. 2012). Given the 
considerable variation in ETRs among firms (Dyreng et al. 2008), significant changes in 
quarterly ETRs (Bauman and Shaw 2005; Comprix et al. 2012), and potential 
information content in the tax accounts (e.g., Lev and Nissim 2004; Hanlon 2005; Ayers 
et al. 2009; Blaylock et al. 2012; Thomas and Zhang 2014), it is important to document 
what specific factors contribute to ETR estimation accuracy.  
 Second, I examine the role of institutional investors and financial analysts. Prior 
research suggests institutional owners and analysts can serve a monitoring or a pressure 
role over financial reporting. Institutional owners serve as monitors who improve the 
accuracy of voluntary earnings forecasts (e.g., Ajinkya et al. 2005); however, prior 
research suggests investors place pressure on managers to meet earnings targets, leading 
to more biased and less accurate estimates (Comprix et al. 2012) . My study extends this 
research by testing whether institutional owners serve a monitoring or pressure role for a 
specific mandatory disclosure (i.e., interim tax reporting). Prior research suggests 
analysts can serve a monitoring role by scrutinizing management behavior (e.g., Chung 
and Jo 1996; Chen et al. 2015), which affects corporate decisions such as investing and 
financing policies (Derrien and Kecskés 2013), innovation (He and Tian 2013), and tax 
avoidance (Allen et al. 2015). However, managers are also pressured by analysts to meet 
optimistic earnings targets (Habib and Hansen 2008), leading to potential manipulation 
of tax expense in order to meet these targets (Dhaliwal et al. 2004). I extend this line of 
research by examining whether financial analysts serve a monitoring role that improves 
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the accuracy of interim ETR estimates or a pressure role that leads to more biased, less 
accurate estimates. 
 Third, I investigate the association between auditor characteristics and interim 
tax reporting accuracy. SEC Regulation S-X (Article 10) requires that an independent 
accountant review interim financial statements, potentially improving the credibility of 
the reported ETR (Bauman and Shaw 2005). Prior research suggests that certain auditor 
characteristics are associated with higher audit quality; however, a review substantially 
differs from an audit and the tax accounts are a challenging area for tax departments and 
auditors (Deloitte 2011), so it is an empirical question as to whether these characteristics 
also improve interim tax reporting accuracy via the interim review process. 
 I next examine whether investor response to information in the tax accounts 
varies based on prior tax reporting accuracy. Hanlon et al. (2005) provide evidence that 
estimated taxable income can serve as an alternative performance measure to pre-tax 
book income and provides incremental information to the market regarding the 
performance of the firm. I extend this analysis by examining whether the investor 
reaction to estimated taxable income as a performance measure varies with prior tax 
reporting accuracy. Gleason and Mills (2008) use a short-window market test and find 
that the reward for beating analysts’ target is significantly discounted for firms that beat 
the target by decreasing ETR from third to fourth quarter. I extend this analysis by 
examining whether the discount varies based on prior tax reporting accuracy. 
 My results indicate that analyst following, institutional ownership, and auditor 
tenure are positively associated with interim tax reporting accuracy, consistent with a 
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monitoring role that improves the accuracy of ETR estimates. My results also indicate 
that geographic complexity, changes in geographic mix of income, discontinued and 
extraordinary items, deferred tax assets, and R&D activity are negatively associated with 
interim tax reporting accuracy. However, these factors are not associated with ETR bias, 
suggesting the observed effect on accuracy is due to these factors’ association with 
estimation error of ETR estimates.  
 Further, I document that the relation between stock returns and changes in 
estimated taxable income is increasing with prior tax reporting accuracy, even while 
controlling for the change in taxable income itself. This result is consistent with 
investors perceiving estimated taxable income as a more reliable performance measure 
when the firm has a record of tax reporting accuracy in recent years. I also document a 
significant market discount for using a decrease in tax expense to beat analysts’ forecast, 
consistent with the result in Gleason and Mills (2008); however, I observe no market 
discount for firms that use tax expense to beat analysts’ forecast that have a history of 
accurate tax reporting. Taken together, these results provide evidence that investor use of 
the reported tax expense significantly varies with prior tax reporting accuracy. 
 My study contributes to the tax, earnings quality, corporate governance, and 
audit literatures. I document the extent to which interim ETR estimates, a material item 
for most firms, conform to the annual ETR as well as several factors that contribute to 
ETR accuracy. I contribute to the audit literature by providing evidence that auditor 
tenure is associated with improved interim ETR accuracy, consistent with a more 
effective interim review process when the auditor has a continuing relationship with the 
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client. My study also contributes to the earnings quality and corporate governance 
literatures by showing that analysts and institutional owners serve a monitoring role that 
improves interim tax reporting accuracy, rather than a pressure role that would lead to 
manipulation and less accurate ETR estimates. I also show that investor response to 
information reported in the tax accounts differs based on prior tax reporting accuracy. 
My results provide insight into how the market values the information in the tax 
accounts and therefore contributes to the literature examining the pricing of tax 
information reported in the financial statements (Graham et al. 2012). Overall, my study 
should interest investors, corporate managers, auditors, academics, and other users of 
financial statements because it provides insight into the reliability of tax expense 
estimates, a material expense for a broad set of firms. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Interim Tax Reporting 
 APB Opinion No. 28, Interim Financial Reporting, requires companies to 
estimate annual ETR based on facts and circumstances known at each interim period and 
to allocate tax expense on a pro rata basis under the integral method.6 The estimated 
ETR should reflect anticipated investment tax credits, foreign tax rates, percentage 
depletion, capital gains rates, and other tax planning alternatives, but unusual or 
extraordinary items should be separately reported or reported net of their related tax 
effect (ASC 740-270-30-8). Under this method, the year-to-date ETR each quarter 
should reflect year-to-date activity as well as management’s forecasted activity for the 
remainder of the year, providing a point estimate of management’s forecasted ETR.7 
Because firms are to include anticipated tax planning in their estimate, even managerial 
actions that cause the ETR estimates to deviate from year-end ETR still fall under my 
definition of accuracy.8 I provide an example of this computation in Appendix B.  
These point estimates may not accurately represent the actual annual ETR for a 
variety of reasons, and I acknowledge that users are likely interested in the underlying 
                                                 
6 The integral method applies to other accounts such as cost of goods sold; however, because the people 
and processes involved in preparing ETR estimates substantially differ from other accounts (Choudhary et 
al. 2015), I am cautious about extending my inferences beyond the tax accounts and overstating my 
conclusions. 
7 A notable exception is when firms have “discrete” items that must be recorded fully in the quarter they 
occur, potentially distorting the role of interim ETRs representing predicted annual ETR. In Section V, I 
re-run my analyses using only firm-quarters free of discrete items and my inferences are unchanged. 
8 I note that even if inaccuracy is caused by a firm consistently changing its tax planning strategy (i.e., 
intentional managerial actions), then users will likely find the current reported information less useful in 
assessing the current and future tax position of the firm.  
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reason for the change and may react to the information differently based on this 
information.9 However, with limited information provided during interim periods10, the 
reported interim ETR (and subsequent changes to it) could serve as a summary measure 
regarding the tax position of the firm. As Graham et al. (2012) note, the purpose of 
reported tax expense is to accurately portray the current financial performance of the 
firm; I assert that the accuracy with which firms report interim tax expense can serve as 
a valuable signal regarding the extent to which reported tax expense serves this purpose. 
When firms are consistently less accurate in reporting their ETR than other firms, their 
reported tax expense is likely less reliable.  
 Prior academic research has examined interim tax reporting in different ways. 
Dhaliwal et al. (2004) report that firms use tax expense as an earnings management tool 
by decreasing ETRs from third to fourth quarter when they would have missed analysts’ 
forecast using third quarter ETR. Comprix et al. (2012) document that quarterly ETR 
estimates are systematically biased upward, creating “slack” that can be used to manage 
earnings. Bauman and Shaw (2005) find that interim ETR disclosures are useful in 
predicting future earnings, but both financial analysts and investors generally under-
utilize this information. Schmidt (2006) finds that initial “tax change component” of 
earnings is more persistent than the revised tax change component, but the market 
                                                 
9 My discussions with practitioners and personal institutional knowledge suggest that the most common 
reasons for ETR changes are changes in mix of foreign and domestic income, tax credits, changes in tax 
reserves, settlements with taxing authorities, and changes in valuation allowance.  
10 Firms are not required to provide a rate reconciliation during interim periods, and often provide 
boilerplate statements (e.g., primarily due to mix of foreign income) regarding reasons their ETR deviates 
from the statutory rate or prior year’s ETR; however, disclosure practices significantly vary by firm. 
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underweights the forecasting implications of the tax change component.11  Taken 
together, these studies suggest that quarterly ETR estimates significantly change 
throughout the year and the changes are often material in amount; however, users do not 
appear to fully utilize the forecasting implications of changes in ETR. I argue that 
heterogeneity in tax reporting accuracy is associated with the reliability of the estimates 
and could therefore provide an explanation for variation in investor use of the 
information. 
 In a concurrent study, Bratten et al. (2016) examine how analysts use 
management interim ETR estimates. They find that complexity and discrete items impair 
management’s ETR accuracy, analysts are more likely to mimic management’s ETR 
estimate when management is more accurate, and analysts’ ETR and EPS forecasts are 
less disperse when management’s estimate is more accurate. Although related, my study 
differs from theirs in several important ways. First, while they focus on analysts’ use of 
management’s reported ETR, I examine investors’ use. Second, I examine both accuracy 
and bias of management ETR estimates, which provides insight into the factors that 
affect accuracy through either bias or estimation error. Third, my analysis includes both 
institutional ownership and auditor characteristics because of the potential influence 
these parties may have on management’s reported ETR estimate. Because of these 
                                                 
11 The “tax change component” of earnings is the earnings generated by changes in effective tax rates. The 
initial tax change component is the change in earnings due to a change in ETR from prior year to the first 
quarter of the current year; the revised tax change is the change in earnings due to changes in ETR from 
the first quarter in the current year to the end of the current year. 
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differences, my study complements theirs and provides additional contributions to our 
knowledge regarding financial reporting of tax expense.12  
Complexity and Interim Tax Estimates 
 Accounting for income taxes is one of the most complex areas in financial 
reporting (Graham et al. 2012) and the tax accounts are among the most restated 
accounts (Deloitte 2011; Whalen and Usvyatsky 2014). While prior research 
acknowledges this complexity and its implications for managerial bias in an earnings 
management context (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Cook et al. 2008; Comprix et al. 2012; 
Christensen et al. 2015), a significant portion of ETR changes are income decreasing, 
suggesting a large amount of estimation error in addition to bias.13  To date, we know 
little about how estimation error affects ETR accuracy, what factors are associated with 
accuracy, or whether accuracy is associated with investor use of the information in the 
tax accounts. 
 It is important to document which factors contribute to estimation error in ETR 
estimates because estimation error is an important element of earnings quality 
(McNichols 2002). For example, in the context of accruals, Dechow and Dichev (2002, 
page 36) argue that “estimation errors and their subsequent corrections are noise that 
                                                 
12 In addition, I examine accuracy of each quarter (i.e., first, second, and third quarters) relative to year-
end rather than next quarter because each quarter’s estimation is intended to represent year-end ETR. 
13 The studies cited above examine tax expense changes generally (i.e., through changes in total ETR); 
other studies examine earnings management using specific tax accounts, such as the valuation allowance 
(e.g., Miller and Skinner 1998; Visvanathan 1998; Bauman et al. 2001; Schrand and Wong 2003; Frank 
and Rego 2006), uncertain tax positions (e.g., Gupta et al. 2015; Cazier et al. 2015), and permanently 
reinvested foreign earnings (e.g., Collins et al. 2001; Krull 2004).  
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reduces the beneficial role of accruals.”  More generally, inaccuracy reduces the 
reliability, usefulness, and therefore quality of amounts reported in financial statements.  
Financial Analysts 
 Prior research suggests financial analysts play a monitoring role by scrutinizing 
management behavior and disseminating information, improving transparency (e.g., 
Jensen and Meckling 1976; Healy and Palepu 2001; Chen et al. 2015). In concurrent 
work, Allen et al. (2015) find analyst coverage is associated with reduced corporate tax 
avoidance, consistent with a monitoring role. However, managers are also pressured by 
analysts to meet optimistic earnings targets (e.g., Healy and Wahlen 1999; Bartov et al. 
2002; Graham et al. 2005; Habib and Hansen 2008). This pressure leads to decreases in 
ETR from third to fourth quarter as a way to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts (Dhaliwal 
et al. 2004). Based on the above arguments, analyst coverage could increase interim tax 
reporting accuracy through increased scrutiny (Chen et al. 2015) or decrease interim tax 
reporting accuracy through pressure to meet earnings targets, leading to building of 
“slack” and subsequent earnings management (Comprix et al. 2012).  
 On the other hand, analysts may have no effect on interim tax reporting accuracy. 
Research suggests that analysts do not incorporate complex tax information in their 
estimates (Plumlee 2003) and fail to fully consider income shifting from high tax rate to 
low tax rate years (Shane and Stock 2006). In addition, Weber (2009) finds that analysts’ 
forecast errors are systematically associated with book-tax differences, suggesting they 
do not incorporate all available tax information into their earnings forecasts. At the same 
time, Bratten et al. (2016) find that individual analysts’ ETR forecasts differ from 
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management estimates 74% of the time, suggesting analysts exert significant effort to 
understand complex tax situations. However, if ETR estimates are sufficiently complex, 
analysts may not be able to successfully serve as a monitor over the tax accounts. 
Therefore, it is an empirical question whether analyst coverage is associated with interim 
tax reporting accuracy. I state my first hypothesis as follows: 
 H1: Analyst coverage is not associated with interim tax reporting accuracy. 
Institutional Ownership 
 Prior research suggests that institutional investors serve a monitoring role in 
mitigating agency problems between shareholders and managers (e.g., Hartzell and 
Starks 2003) and curbing myopic behavior such as cutting R&D to reverse an earnings 
decline (Bushee 1998) or earnings management through discretionary accruals (Rajgopal 
and Venkatachalam 1997; Shang 2003). Ajinkya et al. (2005) note that “institutions 
consistently probe the company for more specific, unbiased, and accurate information 
about future earnings.”  Consistent with this notion, they find that institutional 
ownership is positively associated with the likelihood of forecast occurrence and that the 
forecasts are more specific and accurate. Based on the evidence that institutional owners 
demand specific, unbiased, and accurate information, I expect a positive association 
between institutional ownership and interim tax reporting accuracy.  
 However, managers may provide their best estimate of annual ETR with or 
without monitoring by institutional owners. In addition, the firm’s tax position may be so 
complex that institutional owners may not be able to successfully demand more accurate 
information. If that is the case, I expect no relation between institutional ownership and 
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interim tax reporting accuracy. Finally, high institutional ownership may place pressure 
on management to decrease ETRs and/or avoid increases in ETR, resulting in more 
biased and less accurate interim ETR estimates. Therefore, based on the above 
arguments I state my second hypothesis in null form: 
 H2: Institutional ownership is not associated with interim tax reporting accuracy. 
Auditor Characteristics 
 Auditors play a role in the interim financial reporting process. SEC Regulation S-
X (Article 10) requires interim financial statements to be reviewed by an independent 
accountant, potentially improving their reliability (Manry et al. 2003; Bauman and Shaw 
2005). Specifically related to the tax accounts, auditors examine the basis for estimated 
book-tax differences and inquire about discretionary items as part of their review 
(Bauman and Shaw 2005). Because ETRs can materially affect reported earnings 
(Schmidt 2006; Comprix et al. 2012), are among the most restated accounts (Plumlee 
and Yohn 2010; Deloitte 2011), and require significant estimation and judgement 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Choudhary et al. 2015), the tax accounts are likely among those 
that receive auditor attention during the interim financial statement review.14   
 Prior research examines auditor characteristics and their association with audit 
quality. This line of research suggests that larger audit offices, industry expert auditors, 
                                                 
14 Other review procedures performed by the auditor may include comparing forecasts to actual results, 
comparing results to entities in the same industry, and examining ratios such as inventory turnover and 
expenses as a percentage of sales. Specific examples of additional situations where the auditor would 
ordinarily inquire of management include M&A, revenue recognition, impairment, and derivatives (AU 
Section 722).  
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longer auditor tenure, and Big N auditors are associated with higher audit quality.15 Prior 
research also suggests that auditor-provided tax services (APTS) provide “knowledge 
spillovers” and are associated with improved financial reporting quality (e.g., Kinney et 
al. 2004; Robinson 2008; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2011), fewer tax-related 
restatements (Seetharaman et al. 2011), and fewer tax-related internal control 
weaknesses (DeSimone et al. 2015). Gleason and Mills (2011) provide evidence that 
firms that purchase APTS are fully reserved for IRS disputes, while firms that don’t 
purchase APTS are not.16  
 Thus, prior research suggests that a number of auditor characteristics are 
associated with improved audit and financial reporting quality. However, a review of 
interim reports substantially differs from an audit. An audit includes significant testing 
through inquiry, physical observation, third-party confirmation and other procedures in 
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. On the other hand, the purpose 
of a review is to “provide the accountant with a basis for communicating whether he or 
she is aware of any material modifications that should be made…to conform to the 
applicable financial reporting framework”; a review primarily involves analytical 
procedures and inquiries of management, rather than search and verification procedures 
                                                 
15 Francis and Yu (2009) examine audit office size; Ferguson et al. (2003), Francis et al. (2005), and 
Reichelt and Wang (2010) examine industry expertise; Carcello and Nagy (2004), Knechel and 
Vanstraelen (2007), Myers et al. (2003) examine auditor tenure; see DeFond and Zhang (2014) for an in-
depth review of archival audit research. 
16 I am aware of only one study that finds a negative association between APTS and financial reporting 
quality. Choudhary et al. (2014), find a negative association between APTS and tax accrual quality. In 
addition, Lennox (2015) finds no change in rate of tax misstatements among firms that reduced APTS 
after additional PCAOB restrictions, consistent with APTS having no effect on tax financial reporting 
quality.  
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(AU 722). Therefore, it is unclear whether auditor characteristics that are associated with 
improved audit quality are associated with improved reviews, and whether this translates 
to more accurate or less biased ETR estimates. Therefore, I state my third hypothesis in 
null form: 
H3: Auditor characteristics are not associated with interim tax reporting 
accuracy. 
 
Estimated Taxable Income as a Performance Measure 
 Financial Accounting Concepts Statement No. 8 states that the fundamental 
qualitative characteristics of useful financial information are relevance and faithful 
representation. Information is relevant if it is capable of making a difference in 
decisions by users and has predictive value, confirmatory value, or both. Regarding 
faithful representation, the FASB states the following: 
“To be useful, financial information not only must represent relevant 
phenomena, but it also must faithfully represent the phenomena that it 
purports to represent. To be a perfectly faithful representation, a depiction 
would have three characteristics. It would be complete, neutral, and free 
from error. Of course, perfection is seldom, if ever, achievable. The 
Board’s objective is to maximize those qualities to the extent possible.” 
(FASB 2010, page 17) 
 
 Although ETR estimates may be made faithfully by management using the best 
available information, they are rarely perfect representations of annual ETR (i.e., the 
“phenomena that it purports to represent”). In addition, Comprix et al. (2012) document 
that ETR estimates are systematically biased, meaning they are not always neutral. I 
argue that when users of financial statements consistently observe significant error in 
interim ETR estimates, it could serve as a meaningful signal regarding the reliability of 
the tax expense reported by the firm. 
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 Prior academic research has demonstrated that estimated taxable income, 
calculated using information in the financial statements, provides information to the 
market that is incremental to pretax book income (Hanlon et al. 2005; Ayers et al. 2009). 
However, estimation error in financial statement information creates noise that reduces 
the beneficial role of the information (Dechow and Dichev 2002), and this noise reduces 
the price reaction to the signal (Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988; Kothari 2001; Hanlon 
et al. 2008). Therefore, I examine whether the information contained in the tax accounts 
varies by prior interim tax reporting accuracy, a proxy for potential estimation error, and 
whether the market differentially impounds the information into stock prices. Consistent 
with ETR inaccuracy being associated with noise in the tax accounts, I predict that 
greater prior interim tax reporting accuracy will improve the reliability of information in 
the tax accounts and this information will be more fully reflected in stock prices. 
Therefore, I state my fourth hypothesis as follows: 
H4: Firms with high prior ETR accuracy have more useful information contained 
in the tax accounts. 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Determinants of Interim Tax Reporting Accuracy 
 I examine my research question and test my first three hypotheses by estimating 
the following equation: 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1−2∑𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4−8∑𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑂𝑅it +
𝛽9−23∑𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡             (1) 
 The dependent variable is the absolute value of the difference between year-end 
ETR and the year-to-date ETR from the first, second, and third quarter (ACCURACY1, 
ACCURACY2, and ACCURACY3, respectively). I multiply this value by negative one so 
larger values indicate greater interim tax reporting accuracy.17 Examining the accuracy 
of all three quarters allows me to test which factors systematically affect ETR accuracy 
throughout the year. I also examine factors associated with ETR bias by estimating 
Equation (1) after replacing ACCURACY with the signed difference between year-end 
ETR and the year-to-date ETR from the first, second, and third quarter (∆Q1Q4, ∆Q2Q4, 
and ∆Q3Q4, respectively), where positive values indicate an increase in ETR from 
quarter q to year-end ETR. As noted previously, I interpret factors associated with 
accuracy but not bias as likely contributors to estimation error. 
 ANALYST consists of two variables related to analyst coverage. First, I include 
the number of analysts following the firm (AF) following prior research (He and Tian 
                                                 
17 This calculation is similar to the body of research that examines management forecast accuracy (e.g., 
Hirst et al. 2008; Feng et al. 2009; Bamber et al. 2010; Baik et al. 2011; Billings et al. 2014; Goodman et 
al. 2014). 
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2013; Allen et al. 2015). H1 does not predict a direction on the sign of the AF coefficient 
estimate; however, a positive coefficient would be consistent with analysts playing a 
monitoring role resulting in more accurate ETR estimates. Second, I include an indicator 
variable, EM, equal to one if the firm would have missed the annual analysts’ consensus 
forecast (within five cents) without a change in ETR. This variable controls for the 
incentive to beat analysts’ forecast using tax expense (Dhaliwal et al. 2004).18 IO is 
percent institutional ownership. H2 does not predict the sign of the IO coefficient 
estimate; however, a negative coefficient would be consistent with institutional owners 
playing a monitoring role resulting in more accurate ETR estimates. 
 AUDITOR is a vector of auditor characteristics that have been shown to improve 
audit quality. I include an indicator for Big 4 auditors (BIG4), tax fees paid to the auditor 
(APTS)19, auditor expertise (EXPERT)20, auditor tenure (TENURE), and audit office size 
(OFFICE_SIZE). A positive coefficient estimate on these variables would be consistent 
with the notion that improved audit quality extends to the interim review process, 
resulting in more accurate ETR reporting.  
                                                 
18 Prior research generally finds that firms decrease ETR to meet analysts’ forecasts but not other earnings 
targets (see Graham et al. 2012 for a review); in untabulated analysis I also do not find that firms decrease 
ETR to meet prior year earnings, so I only include the incentive to beat analysts’ forecast as a control in 
my main analysis. 
19 My primary analysis examines auditor-provided tax fees; however I also examine other non-audit 
services. Untabulated results indicate no relation between other non-audit services and interim tax 
reporting accuracy.  
20 In my primary analysis I define EXPERT following McGuire et al. (2012) as a measure of combined 
audit and tax expertise. See Appendix C for details. In untabulated analyses, I replace EXPERT with 
TAX_EXPERT or AUDIT_EXPERT following McGuire et al. (2012) and find no significant relation 
between tax-specific or audit-only expertise and ETR accuracy. 
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 FIRM_FACTORS is a vector of firm-specific characteristics that are likely 
associated with the complexity of the tax accounts based on evidence in prior research. I 
include firm size (SIZE) because research suggests larger firms have more opportunity 
for tax planning (e.g., Omer et al. 1993; Rego 2003; De Simone et al. 2014). Larger 
firms may have more complex tax situations resulting in less accurate ETR estimates, 
but also may have more effective tax departments that could produce more accurate ETR 
estimates. Therefore, I do not predict the sign of the association between SIZE and 
ACCURACY. To examine various components of tax complexity, I include number of 
geographic and business segments (GEO_SEGS and BUS_SEGS, respectively), changes 
in geographic mix of income (∆MIX)21, merger and acquisition activity (M&A), research 
and development activity (R&D), discontinued operations and extraordinary items 
(DISC_EXTRA), deferred taxes (DTA), and equity compensation (EQUITY_COMP) 
because prior research suggests these factors are associated with tax rates and therefore 
could create complexity in the tax function and estimating interim ETRs (e.g., Klassen et 
al. 1993; Collins et al. 1998; Robinson et al. 2010; De Simone et al. 2014; Bratten et al. 
2016; De Simone et al. 2015). I include sales growth (∆SALES) and prior earnings 
volatility (EARN_VOL) to examine factors related to the difficulty of forecasting 
earnings (e.g., Baik et al. 2011; Goodman et al. 2014). I also include leverage (LEV), 
profitability (ROA), market-to-book ratio (MTB), and abnormal accruals (ABACC) to 
                                                 
21 I use absolute value of changes in geographic mix of income because both increases and decreases in 
ratio of foreign to total income could affect the ability to successfully predict the ETR implications of such 
a change. 
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control for additional firm characteristics. I expect the tax complexity and earnings 
forecast difficulty variables to be negatively associated with interim tax reporting 
accuracy; however, it is an empirical question as to which factors are associated with 
both accuracy and bias. Finally, I include year and industry fixed effects to control for 
cross-sectional and time-series variation across industries and years and standard errors 
are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). All variable definitions are 
included in Appendix C.  
Self-Selection Correction 
 The decision for a company to purchase tax services from its auditor is not 
random (e.g., Lassila et al. 2010) and could introduce self-selection bias into my analysis 
(Li and Prabhala 2005). I therefore estimate a two-equation model to measure treatment 
effects (e.g., Greene 2000; Luez and Verrecchia 2000). Specifically, I follow McGuire et 
al. (2012) and estimate the following probit regression to model the firm’s decision to 
purchase tax services from the external auditor: 
Pr⁡(𝐴𝑃𝑇𝑆 = 1)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐸𝐶_𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽𝑚𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁1𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              (2) 
 EQUATION1 is the vector of variables from Equation (1), and all other variables 
are defined in Appendix C. I use the estimates from Equation (2) to construct an inverse 
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Mills ratio (IMR) and include this as a control variable in Equation (1). The inverse Mills 
ratio accounts for self-selection and yields consistent parameter estimates using OLS.22   
Information Content of Tax Accounts 
 I also test the association between prior tax reporting accuracy and the 
information content of the tax accounts. My primary empirical test examines the slope 
coefficient relating long-window returns to changes in estimated taxable income and its 
interaction with prior interim tax reporting accuracy. This test follows prior research 
(e.g., Francis et al. 2005; Hanlon et al. 2008) that interprets the slope coefficient as a 
measure of the informativeness of earnings. Specifically, I examine the informativeness 
of pretax earnings changes, estimated taxable income changes, and the effect of tax 
reporting accuracy by estimating the following regression: 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽33𝑌𝑅_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4∆𝑇𝐼𝑥3𝑌𝑅_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡⁡                                 (3) 
 Following Hanlon et al. (2005), RETURN is the 16 month market-adjusted return 
for firm i starting at beginning of fiscal year t and ending four months after the end of 
fiscal year t. ∆PTBI and ∆TI are year to year changes in pretax and estimated taxable 
income, respectively. Importantly, taxable income is estimated using amounts in the 
financial statements, which is available to investors. 3YR_ACCURACY is the quartile 
                                                 
22 Lennox et al. (2012) provide guidance on implementing self-selection correction procedures. Consistent 
with their guidance, Equation (2) contains exclusionary variables (i.e., independent variables in the first-
stage model not included in the second-stage model). The variables in the first-stage model not included in 
the second stage model are LNAUDFEES, OPPORTUNITY, EQINC, PPE, CASH, DEP, and SEC_TIER. 
Lennox et al. (2012) also argue that the inverse Mills ratio may induce results in the second-stage model. 
In untabulated analyses, I exclude the inverse Mills ratio from Equation (1); my inferences are unchanged. 
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rank of interim tax reporting accuracy over the prior three years, where higher values 
indicate greater accuracy. Because tax differences vary across industries (Mills and 
Newberry 2001), I rank 3YR_ACCURACY by industry (two-digit SIC code) and I scale 
the ranks to range between -0.5 and 0.5. Appendix C provides specific calculations for 
all variables.  
 Consistent with prior research (Hanlon et al. 2005; Ayers et al. 2009), I expect β1 
and β2 to be positive, indicating that both pretax and taxable income provide information 
to the market. Based on H4, I predict that β4 will be positive, indicating a stronger 
relation between returns and changes in estimated taxable income when the firm has 
reported its tax estimates more accurately in the past. Note that by examining the 
interaction between accuracy and changes in taxable income, while including the main 
effect for changes in taxable income, this analysis allows me to test how the association 
between estimated taxable income and returns varies by prior tax reporting accuracy. 
Therefore, this test is designed to examine whether the information content of taxable 
income estimated from the financial statements is improved when there is less estimation 
error, as proxied by prior tax reporting accuracy. 
 As an additional test of how the information content of estimated taxable income 
varies with prior tax reporting accuracy, I examine the relative information content of 
changes in estimated taxable income to book income for high and low accuracy firms. 
By examining the relative information content, I am able to directly test the information 
content of tax expense (i.e., the numerator of the ETR) relative to pre-tax book income 
(i.e., the denominator of the ETR). My test follows prior research (Hanlon et al. 2005; 
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Ayers et al. 2009) and measures the information content of estimated taxable and book 
income as the adjusted R2 of regressions of returns on each measure of income 
individually. Specifically, I estimate the following equations annually for high and low 
accuracy firms: 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡            (4) 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (5) 
I then test the average yearly ratio of the adjusted R2 from Equation (4) and (5) 
for each group of firms. As noted in Ayers et al. (2009), the advantage of this research 
design is that it allows me to compare the relative information content of the two income 
measures while holding returns for the firm constant; it does not compare adjusted R2 of 
estimated taxable income across samples, which would be susceptible to possible 
alternative explanations. That is, differences in the relative information content of 
taxable income and pre-tax income help to rule out the explanation that prior ETR 
accuracy is correlated with a firm characteristic that would affect the association 
between both income measures and returns. H4 predicts that the ratio of adjusted R2 
from Equation (4) to adjusted R2 from Equation (5) will be greater for high tax reporting 
accuracy firms because the information contained in the tax accounts will be perceived 
as higher quality and therefore more reliable. 
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IV. RESULTS 
Sample Discussion 
 My primary sample includes all firm-year observations at the intersection of 
Audit Analytics, Compustat, IBES, and Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings 
databases from 2002 to 2013 for which all variables are available. I require audit and tax 
fee data from Audit Analytics, financial statement data from Compustat, institutional 
ownership data from Thomson Reuters, and analyst forecast data from IBES. I begin my 
sample period in 2002 because of the limited availability of auditor-provided tax service 
fee data prior to 2002 as well as changes in auditing and reporting requirements 
following SOX. Consistent with prior tax research, I exclude financial institutions and 
utilities (SIC codes 6000-6999 or 4900-4999), firm-years with negative pre-tax income, 
ETRs greater than 1 or less than zero in any quarter, total assets less than $10 million, 
and I winsorize continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the 
influence of outliers. These requirements result in a sample of 13,509 firm-year 
observations. Table 1 summarizes my sample selection procedure. 
Descriptive and Univariate Results 
 Figure 1 presents histograms of changes in ETR from the first, second, and third 
quarter to fourth quarter in Panel A, B, and C, respectively. Overall, Figure 1 suggests 
substantial variation in ETR changes and a significant number of these changes are 
large. In fact, 9.8 (16.0) percent of observations have ETR increases (decreases) of more 
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than 5.0 percent from first to fourth quarter.23 I note that some bias appears to exist in 
my sample (i.e., the distribution is centered left of zero); however, a large portion of 
observations have positive ETR changes (39.1, 39.2, and 43.2 percent are positive from 
first, second, and third quarters, respectively).  
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables needed in my analysis. 
The mean of ACCURACY1, ACCURACY2, and ACCURACY3 indicate that the absolute 
value of firms’ ETR changes from first, second, and third quarter to year-end ETR are 
4.8, 3.8, and 2.8 percent on average. This pattern is consistent with the expectation that 
firms provide more accurate ETR estimates later in the year. Table 2 also provides 
evidence that ETR changes in my sample exhibit some bias, shown by negative mean 
and median values of ∆Q1Q2, ∆Q2Q4, and ∆Q3Q4.  
 Regarding auditor characteristics, approximately 87 percent of firms in my 
sample are audited by Big 4 auditors, an average of 11 percent of total fees paid to the 
auditor are tax fees, and average tenure is approximately 7.7 years. Approximately 42 
percent of firm years in my sample are audited by experts, approximately the same 
proportion as in McGuire et al. (2012). My observations have an average of six analysts 
following the firm and have 64 percent institutional ownership. Approximately ten 
percent of my observations would have missed analysts’ forecasts without a change in 
ETR from third to fourth quarter within five cents (i.e., EM = 1); therefore, my sample is 
much broader than studies that specifically examine earnings management through tax 
                                                 
23 Observations with increases (decreases) of more than 5.0 percent from second to fourth and third to 
fourth quarter are 7.4 (12.7) percent and 5.8 (8.3) respectively.  
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expense (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2004) because it is not restricted to firm-years within five 
cents of analysts’ consensus forecast. 
 Next, I discuss univariate correlations between my variables (untabulated). Not 
surprisingly, ACCURACY1, ACCURACY2, and ACCURACY3 are positively correlated. 
All three accuracy variables are negatively correlated with a number of tax complexity 
and forecast difficulty variables. Regarding H1, accuracy is positively correlated with 
AF, suggesting analysts may play a monitoring role that results in more accurate interim 
ETR estimates. Regarding H2, accuracy is positively correlated with IO, suggesting 
institutional owners are also able to serve a monitoring role over interim ETR reporting. 
Regarding H3, accuracy is positively correlated with BIG4, APTS, and TENURE, 
suggesting Big 4 auditors, auditor-provided tax services, and auditor tenure may be 
associated with improved interim review process resulting in more accurate ETR 
estimates.24  
Multivariate Results 
 Table 3 Panel A reports the results of estimating the first-stage model, Equation 
(2), to address the potential endogeneity of firms selecting to purchase tax services from 
their auditor. The area under the ROC curve is 0.81, suggesting good discriminatory 
power (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2002). The results of my selection model are generally 
consistent with those reported by both Lassila et al. (2010) and McGuire et al. (2012).  
                                                 
24 I note that a number of the variables in my analysis are highly correlated (e.g., the correlation between 
SIZE and AF is 0.66). Untabulated analysis suggests that multicollinearity is not a major concern in my 
regressions. The largest variance inflation factor in my analysis is 2.82 on SIZE and prior work suggests a 
variance inflation factor of 10 as being large enough to indicate a problem (Chatterjee and Price 1991).  
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 Table 3 Panel B presents the results of the interim tax reporting accuracy model, 
which simultaneously estimates the treatment and outcome model (Equations 2 and 1). 
Columns 1, 2, and 3 present the results when the dependent variable is ACCURACY1, 
ACCURACY2, and ACCURACY3, respectively. In column two I find that RHO, which 
represents the correlation between error terms in Equations (1) and (2), is statistically 
significant, suggesting the use of a treatment effects model is important to control for 
endogeneity. However, I find that APTS is not significantly associated with interim tax 
reporting accuracy. Therefore, I find no evidence that auditor-provided tax services are 
associated with interim tax reporting accuracy in this analysis, although it is important to 
control for this potential endogeneity issue ex ante.25  
 Regarding H1, I find that analyst following (AF) is positively associated with 
interim tax reporting accuracy in the second and third quarters (p-values < 0.05). These 
results reject H1 and are consistent with analysts serving a monitoring role that improves 
the accuracy of second and third quarter ETR estimates. Regarding H2, I find that 
institutional ownership (IO) is positively associated with interim tax reporting accuracy 
in all three quarters (p-values <0.01). These results reject H2 and provide evidence that 
institutional investors serve a monitoring role resulting in more accurate ETR estimates. 
Although analyst following and institutional ownership likely overlap (i.e., they are 
positively correlated), both coefficients are significant in my analysis indicating each 
                                                 
25 My inferences are unchanged when estimating Equation (2) without the treatment effects model. 
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serves an incremental monitoring role.26 Interestingly, firms with the incentive to 
manage earnings through tax accounts to meet or beat analysts’ expectations (EM =1) 
have more accurate ETR estimates, on average. A plausible explanation for this result is 
that to be in this set of firms (i.e., within five cents of analysts’ forecast), analysts’ 
forecast must be relatively accurate and this is more likely when the firm reports more 
accurate information. 
 Regarding H3, I find evidence that auditor tenure is positively associated with 
interim tax reporting accuracy, consistent with improved auditor-client communication 
and higher quality reviews when the auditor has been serving the client for a longer 
period. However, I do not find strong evidence that Big 4 auditors, auditor-provided tax 
services, audit office size, or expertise is consistently associated with interim tax 
reporting accuracy.27 Although prior research generally suggests these characteristics are 
associated with improved audit quality, I do not find strong evidence that these 
characteristics improve the interim review process of the tax accounts.28 
 Regarding the firm characteristics associated with interim tax reporting accuracy, 
I find that firm size (SIZE) and profitability (ROA) are both positively associated with 
                                                 
26 I further explore the monitoring roles of analyst following and institutional ownership by examining 
their association with ETR estimation bias (Table 3 Panel C) as well as positive and negative ETR 
surprises (Table 4). 
27 Several auditor variables are highly correlated, so I also estimate my regressions while including each 
individually; my inferences remain unchanged, suggesting multicollinearity of the auditor variables is not 
driving the insignificant results. 
28 In untabulated analyses, I create a composite “auditor score” as the sum of BIG4, EXPERT, and 
indicator variables equal to one if the firm is above the median for each continuous variable. This 
composite score is positively associated with tax reporting accuracy, but the result appears driven by 
tenure; the composite score becomes insignificantly associated with accuracy if I remove tenure from the 
composite score. 
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accuracy. As expected, I find that geographic complexity (GEO_SEGS), changes in 
geographic mix of income (∆MIX), R&D activity (R&D), discontinued operations and 
extraordinary items (DISC_EXTRA), deferred tax assets (DTA), and equity compensation 
(EQUITY_COMP) are negatively associated with interim tax reporting accuracy. The 
coefficient estimate on earnings volatility (EARN_VOL) is negative and significant in the 
first and second columns but not the third column. The reduction in significance later in 
the year is consistent with volatile earnings being an important determinant of ETR 
accuracy early in the year, but less important as uncertainty regarding annual earnings is 
resolved.  
In sum, Table 3 Panel B provides insight into firm characteristics, auditor 
characteristics, and market participants that are associated with interim tax reporting 
accuracy. I provide evidence that analyst following and institutional ownership are 
associated with improved interim tax reporting accuracy, rejecting H1 and H2. 
Regarding H3, I find that auditor tenure is associated with improved interim tax 
reporting accuracy, but do not find such an association with other auditor characteristics.  
Interim Tax Reporting Bias 
 Because prior research suggests a level of bias in interim tax reporting estimates 
(e.g., Comprix et al. 2012), and that bias may contribute to ETR accuracy, I also 
examine what factors are systematically associated with signed ETR changes. I re-
estimate Equations (1) and (2) after replacing the dependent variable in Equation (2) 
with signed changes in ETRs from the first, second, and third to the fourth quarter 
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(∆Q1Q4, ∆Q2Q4, and ∆Q3Q4), where positive amounts represent an increase in ETR 
from quarter q to year-end ETR. These results are presented in Table 3 Panel C.29 
 Regarding the influence of market participants, I find that firms with the 
incentive to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts (EM = 1) decrease their ETRs on average 
(p-values < 0.05 in quarters 2 and 3), consistent with prior research (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 
2004).30 However, I find that analyst following is positively associated with ETR 
changes (p-values < 0.01 in quarters 2 and 3). This result is consistent with analysts 
serving a monitoring role by either curbing tax planning later in the year that is 
“aggressive” or by reducing “slack” in interim ETRs that creates bias (e.g., Comprix et 
al. 2012). In contrast, I find that institutional ownership is negatively associated with 
ETR changes. This result is consistent with institutional owners applying pressure on 
firms regarding ETR changes, either by demanding additional tax planning that reduces 
ETRs or by penalizing surprise ETR increases, resulting in biased ETR estimates to 
avoid ETR increases.31  Both the analyst following and institutional ownership results 
have two explanations discussed above; therefore, in my next analysis, I add more 
                                                 
29 In this test, RHO is not significant in any column; I re-estimate Equation (2) under this specification 
without the treatment effects model and my inferences are unchanged.  
30 In an untabulated test, I create a variable that is the mirror-image of EM (i.e., an indicator equal to one if 
they firm would have beat the analyst forecast using prior quarter ETR by less than five cents, and zero 
otherwise) to control for the possibility that firms increase tax expense when they would have otherwise 
beat analysts’ forecasts in order to smooth income or create a “cookie jar reserve.” I do not find this 
variable is significantly associated with ETR changes, suggesting this behavior does not occur in my 
sample on average. 
31 I acknowledge that even if institutional owners do not actually “penalize surprise ETR increases,” firms 
may still attempt to avoid surprise ETR increases to avoid a potential negative reaction. 
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conclusive evidence by examining the association of analyst following and institutional 
ownership with positive and negative ETR changes. 
 Regarding firm characteristics, I find little evidence of systematic bias associated 
with changes in geographic mix of income, R&D activity, deferred tax assets, or equity 
compensation even though these factors are strongly associated with accuracy. These 
results suggest that the large estimation error related to these factors is approximately 
evenly distributed between ETR increases and decreases; that is, I find strong evidence 
of estimation error but no evidence of bias related to these factors.32   
Positive and Negative ETR Surprises 
 To provide additional insight into interim tax reporting accuracy and bias, I 
examine positive and negative ETR “surprises.” It is possible that the results observed in 
Table 3 are caused by certain factors being associated with an increased propensity to 
decrease (increase) ETRs throughout the year, or a decreased propensity to increase 
(decrease) ETRs. For example, in Table 3 Panel C I find institutional ownership is 
negatively associated with ETR increases; this observed relation could be because firms 
with high institutional ownership tend to tax plan and have greater decreases in ETR 
throughout the year on average. However, it could also be because firms with high 
institutional ownership tend to avoid increases in ETR. Both of these explanations are 
plausible, so I examine this question further. 
                                                 
32 In additional analyses I examine these factors using a “de-biased” accuracy measure. See Section V for 
details. 
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 I estimate a multinomial logit regression with POS_SURPRISE and 
NEG_SURPRISE as my dependent variables. POS_SURPRISE (NEG_SURPRISE) is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year has an increase (decrease) in ETR from 
third to fourth quarter of greater than five percent, and zero otherwise.33 This test allows 
me to examine which factors are associated with substantial changes in ETRs and also 
allows the changes to be directional, addressing the issue discussed above. I include all 
independent variables from Equation (1) in this analysis. Table 4 presents the results.  
 I find that analyst following is negatively associated with negative ETR 
surprises, but not associated with positive ETR surprises. This result is consistent with 
the result in Table 3 Panel C (i.e., analyst following is associated with positive ETR 
changes); however, this result provides an additional insight: the relation is caused by a 
reduced likelihood of negative ETR changes rather than firms actually increasing ETR at 
year end (i.e., AF is not associated with POS_SURPRISE). A lower likelihood of 
negative ETR surprises is consistent with a monitoring role of analysts because this 
could be caused by reductions in aggressive tax planning at year end or less bias in 
interim periods that causes an ETR decrease at the end of the year. Taken together, my 
results suggest that analysts play a monitoring role over the tax accounts that results in 
more accurate ETR estimates during interim periods and a lower likelihood of negative 
ETR surprises at year end.  
                                                 
33 My inferences are unchanged using first to fourth or second to fourth quarter, but I focus on ETR 
surprises from third to fourth quarter because research in this area has focused on “last chance” 
manipulations of ETR from the third to fourth quarter, and large increases in third to fourth quarter should 
be the greatest “surprise” because more information is available at third quarter than first or second 
quarter. 
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 I find that institutional ownership is negatively associated with positive ETR 
surprises but not associated with negative ETR surprises from the third to fourth quarter. 
This result is consistent with Table 3 Panel C (i.e., institutional ownership is negatively 
associated with ETR changes); however, the relation is caused by a lower likelihood of 
positive surprises rather than greater decreases in ETR at year end (i.e., IO is not 
associated with NEG_SURPRISE). A lower likelihood of positive ETR surprises is 
consistent with firms avoiding surprises that could have a negative impact on earnings 
per share which would be viewed negatively by investors. However, because I find no 
evidence that institutional ownership is associated with negative ETR surprises, I 
conclude that the negative association between institutional ownership and ETR changes 
observed in Table 3 Panel C is caused by a lower likelihood of ETR increases, rather 
than additional tax planning at year end. Taken together, my results suggest that 
institutional owners play a monitoring role over the tax accounts that results in more 
accurate interim ETR estimates and part of this monitoring role is encouraging fewer 
positive ETR surprises at year end.  
Information Content Results 
 Next, I examine the consequences of interim tax reporting accuracy by testing the 
association between stock returns and estimated taxable income. For this analysis, I 
follow the sample selection procedures in Ayers et al. (2009). I collect observations for 
which all data needed for my analysis are available at the intersection of Compustat and 
CRSP from 1993 through 2013. I exclude financial institutions and utilities (SIC codes 
6000-6999 or 4900-4999), firm-years with fiscal year changes, and firm-years with the 
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absolute value of the change in pre-tax book income (∆PTBI) or estimated taxable 
income (∆TI) greater than one. I also require positive tax expense (GAAP_ETR5) and 
pre-tax book income over the past 5 years. These criteria result in a sample of 31,324 
firm-year observations.  
 Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for my information content sample. I 
separately present descriptive statistics for RETURN, ∆PTBI, ∆TI, and GAAP_ETR5 for 
the overall sample, those in the top quartile of accuracy based on 3YR_ACCURACY 
(“high accuracy firms”), and all other firms. The descriptive statistics for the overall 
sample are similar to those in Ayers et al. (2009). I find that high accuracy firms do not 
have significantly different returns, changes in pre-tax income, or changes in estimated 
taxable income from all other firms. Interestingly, high accuracy firms have a 
significantly lower mean five-year GAAP ETRs than all other firms, although I note the 
opposite is true for the 25th and 50th percentiles.34  
 Table 6 presents the results of estimating Equation (3) for the full sample 
(columns 1 and 2), the pre-SOX sample (columns 3 and 4) and the post-SOX sample 
(columns 5 and 6). In the odd numbered columns, I regress returns on changes in pre-tax 
book income and changes in taxable income. The positive and significant coefficients on 
both variables (p-values < 0.01 in all columns) are consistent with prior research 
(Hanlon et al. 2005; Ayers et al. 2009) and suggest that estimated taxable income 
provides information to the market that is incremental to  changes in pre-tax income. In 
                                                 
34 I perform an analysis using a high versus low accuracy sample matched on level of ETR in order to rule 
out the explanation that low ETRs are also more difficult to report accurately.  
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the even numbered columns, I find that the coefficient on the interaction term 
∆TIx3YR_ACCURACY is positive and significant, providing evidence that the 
information contained in estimated taxable income is increasing in prior ETR accuracy, 
even after controlling for the magnitude of the change in taxable income itself (∆TI). I 
interpret these results as evidence that potential error in taxable income significantly 
affects the association between stock returns and estimated taxable income, consistent 
with H4. 
 Table 7 reports the results of my second test of how the relative information 
content of estimated taxable income versus pre-tax income varies by prior ETR 
accuracy. In Panel A, I split the firms based on the median of 3YR_ACCURACY and 
compare the ratio of adjusted R2 values of yearly estimates of Equations (4) to adjusted 
R2 values of yearly estimates of Equation (5) for each subsample. Because I estimate 
Equations (4) and (5) separately using the same firm-year observations, a higher ratio of 
R2TI / R
2
PTBI indicates a stronger relation between returns and changes in taxable income 
relative to the relation between returns and changes in pretax income for the same firm. 
Intuitively, this means that there is relatively more information content in taxable income 
when this ratio is high. I therefore examine the relative information content of taxable 
income by testing the difference in average yearly ratio of R2TI / R
2
PTBI for each group of 
firms.  
 In Panel A, the average ratio for all years is 0.601 for high accuracy firms, 
compared to 0.384 for low accuracy firms, and the difference is statistically significant 
(p-value < 0.01 using both t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test). This result suggests the 
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information content of estimated taxable income has relatively more information content 
when the firm has been more accurate with tax estimates in the past, consistent with H4. 
These results suggest that the relative information content of taxable income for low 
accuracy firms is only 64 percent (0.384 / 0.601 = 64 percent) of the information content 
of high accuracy firms.  
 I examine the extreme ends of the distribution of 3 year accuracy in Panels B and 
C. Specifically, in Panel B I split the sample into the top quartile based on 
3YR_ACCURACY and all other firms. For the full sample period, I find that the ratio of 
R2TI / R
2
PTBI is significantly higher for high accuracy firms compared to all other firms 
(p-value < 0.01 using both t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test). In Panel C, I split the 
sample into the lowest quartile based on 3YR_ACCURACY and all other firms. For the 
full sample period, I find that the ratio of R2TI / R
2
PTBI is significantly lower for low 
accuracy firms compared to all other firms (p-value < 0.01 using both t-test and 
Wilcoxon rank sum test).The results of both these analysis are consistent with H4 and 
provide evidence that accuracy is associated with the level of information content of 
taxable income at both ends of the distribution of tax accuracy. 
 Notably, Ayers et al. (2009) provide evidence that the information content of 
taxable income is lower for high tax planning firms (i.e., firms with low GAAP_ETR5).35 
To the extent that high tax planning firms are also inaccurate, my results could be driven 
by tax planning rather than prior reporting accuracy. To mitigate this concern, I split 
                                                 
35 In untabulated results I replicate this finding using my sample. 
 39 
 
firms into high and low accuracy based on 3YR_ACCURACY and perform my analysis 
on a sample of firms matched on level of tax planning. Specifically, I match each high 
accuracy firm with a low accuracy firm based on year, 2-digit SIC code, and 
GAAP_ETR5.36 This matching procedure results in 13,276 firm-year observations for 
each sample, or 26,552 total. Untabulated analysis shows no significant difference in 
level of tax planning (i.e., GAAP_ETR5) between the matched samples (p-value = 0.93).    
 Results from this analysis are presented in Table 7 Panel D. Even after matching 
firms based on tax planning, I find that high accuracy firms have relatively more 
information content in estimated taxable income than low accuracy firms. The average 
R2TI / R
2
PTBI for all years in the matched sample is 0.814 for high accuracy firms and 
0.469 for low accuracy firms, suggesting the information content for low accuracy firms 
is only 58 percent of the information content of high accuracy firms on average, even 
after controlling for level of tax planning. In sum, the results in Tables 6 and 7 provide 
strong evidence consistent with H4 and suggest that prior tax reporting accuracy 
provides a signal to the market about the informativeness of reported tax expense.  
Market Response to Beating Analysts’ Targets Using Tax Expense 
 To further investigate the effect of tax reporting accuracy on investor response to 
reported tax expense, I examine short-window returns surrounding earnings 
announcements for firms that beat analysts’ forecasts by decreasing their tax rate from 
third to fourth quarter. Gleason and Mills (2008) show that when firms use tax expense 
                                                 
36 The matching procedure required that GAAP_ETR5 of the low accuracy firm must be between 90% and 
110% of GAAP_ETR of the high accuracy firm. 
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to beat analysts’ forecasts, the market discounts the reward by approximately 86% on 
average. I extend this analysis by testing whether this discount varies based on prior tax 
reporting accuracy. To the extent that inaccurate estimates provide a signal regarding the 
potential error in reported tax expense, I expect that the market discount will be greater 
for firms that have been inaccurate in prior years. This expectation is consistent with 
noise reducing the price reaction to accounting information (Holthausen and Verrecchia 
1988; Kothari 2001; Hanlon et al. 2008). 
 First, I replicate the results in Gleason and Mills (2008), presented in column 1 of 
Table 8. Specifically, I regress cumulative size-adjusted abnormal returns (CAR) for the 
five day window around the earnings announcement on Beat_w_Tax, an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm used a tax rate decrease to beat analysts’ forecast and 
zero otherwise, and control variables following Gleason and Mills (2008). The 
coefficient estimate on Beat_w_Tax in column 1 is negative (p-value < 0.01), which is 
consistent with Gleason and Mills (2008) and indicates that the market discounts the 
reward for beating analysts’ forecasts by using tax expense.  
 Next, I split firms that beat analysts’ forecast into two groups based on prior tax 
reporting accuracy (3YR_ACCURACY). Beat_w_Tax_Accurate is an indicator variable 
equal to one for firms that beat analysts’ target and are above the median of 
3YR_ACCURACY, zero otherwise. Beat_w_Tax_Inaccurate is an indicator variable 
equal to one for firms that beat analysts’ target and are below the median of 
3YR_ACCURACY, zero otherwise. The results in column 2 of Table 8 indicate a 
significant market discount for firms that beat the analysts’ forecasts and have been 
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inaccurate in the past; however, I do not find a similar market discount for firms that 
have a record of accurate tax reporting. These results suggest that investor response to 
beating earnings targets using tax expense varies with prior tax reporting accuracy, a 
potential signal for the reliability of reported tax expense.  
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V. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
Extracting Bias from Accuracy 
 In addition to my main tests that examine both accuracy and bias, I take another 
approach to separate the estimation error and bias. I “de-bias” the accuracy measure 
(ACCURACY) by removing the estimated amount of bias in the estimated ETR reported 
at interim periods and use the adjusted accuracy measure as a dependent variable when 
estimating Equation (1). Prior research uses a similar approach to extract predictable 
errors from analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Ali et al. 1992; Larocque 2013). 
 First, I regress the signed difference between year-end ETR and the year-to-date 
ETR from the first, second, and third quarter (∆Q1Q4, ∆Q2Q4, and ∆Q3Q4, 
respectively) on all variables included in Equation (1). Second, I estimate the predicted 
bias for each observation based on the coefficient estimates from these regressions. I 
remove the predicted bias (i.e., signed change in ETR) from each observation by 
subtracting the predicted bias from the actual change in ETR from first, second, and 
third quarter to year-end ETR to calculate de-biased changes in ETR. I then take the 
absolute value of the de-biased changes in ETR and multiply by negative one to generate 
ETR accuracy measures (ACC1_unbiased, ACC2_unbiased, and ACC3_unbiased) with 
the predicted ETR bias removed. These accuracy measures represent the (in)accuracy of 
the ETR estimates that are not attributable to bias, and therefore are attributable to 
estimation error.  
 I re-estimate Equation (1) after replacing the de-biased accuracy measures as the 
dependent variable and present the results in Table 9. Consistent with my main analysis, 
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I find that analyst following, institutional ownership, and auditor tenure are associated 
with more accurate ETR reporting, while a number of factors that contribute to firm 
complexity (e.g., geographic segments, changes in mix of foreign and domestic income, 
R&D expenses, earnings volatility, discontinued and extraordinary items, deferred tax 
assets, and equity compensation) are associated with less accurate ETR reporting using 
the de-biased accuracy measure. Thus, my main conclusions regarding the effect of these 
factors on accuracy through estimation error, rather than bias, are unchanged. 
Discrete Period Items 
 Accounting standards require that firms recognize certain “discrete” items in the 
quarter they occur, potentially distorting the ability for the quarterly ETR to predict 
annual ETR. Consistent with this possibility, Bratten et al. (2016) find that discrete 
period items reduce the ability for management’s reported ETR and analysts implied 
ETR to predict next-quarter ETR. To address the concern that my main results are driven 
by discrete period items, I follow Bratten et al. (2016) and conservatively label quarters 
as “clean” (i.e., likely free of discrete items) if the reported GAAP ETR is within 0.5% 
(on either side) from the IBES actual ETR and re-run my accuracy analysis using this 
clean subsample. This procedure assumes management’s ETR estimate is free of discrete 
items when it matches the IBES actual ETR because the IBES actual ETR is adjusted for 
items that require discrete accounting treatment. Thus, if the quarter had a significant 
discrete period item the IBES actual ETR would not match management’s ETR estimate 
due to this adjustment. In untabulated results, I find the coefficient estimate for IO, AF, 
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and TENURE remain positive and significant using the “clean” subsample.37  Thus, my 
conclusions regarding hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 remain unchanged after removing the 
potential effect of discrete period items. 
                                                 
37However, I note that for this analysis the coefficient estimate on analyst following is significant for first 
and third quarter estimates but not second quarter estimates as in my main analysis. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 While a significant number of prior studies have focused on the variation in 
effective tax rates among firms (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008), my study examines the causes 
and consequences of within firm-year GAAP effective tax rate reporting accuracy. I use 
the financial reporting requirements under APB 28, Interim Financial Reporting, to 
examine the determinants of ETR estimation accuracy as well as the importance of tax 
reporting accuracy on investor reaction to information contained in tax reporting.  
 I find that analyst following, institutional ownership, and auditor tenure are 
positively associated with interim tax reporting accuracy. These results are consistent 
with a monitoring role over financial reporting of the tax accounts which results in more 
accurate ETR estimates. My results also suggest that analysts and institutional investors 
play different monitoring roles: analysts appear to reduce bias in ETR estimates that 
result in earnings increasing ETR surprises at year end, while institutional owners 
appear to reduce earnings decreasing ETR surprises at year end. I also find that firm 
size, profitability, and auditor tenure are positively associated with interim tax reporting 
accuracy, and that geographic complexity, change in geographic mix of income, 
discontinued and extraordinary items, deferred tax assets, and R&D activity are 
negatively associated with interim tax reporting accuracy. However, I do not find that 
these factors are associated with tax reporting bias, suggesting their association with less 
accurate reporting is due to estimation error. 
 I also examine whether the market reaction to information contained in the tax 
accounts varies by prior tax reporting accuracy. I find a stronger association between 
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stock returns and changes in estimated taxable income when interim tax reporting has 
been more accurate in the past, suggesting interim tax reporting accuracy provides a 
signal to the market about the usefulness of tax amounts reported in the financial 
statements. I also find that investors respond more positively to beating analysts’ 
forecasts using a decrease in tax rate when the firm has a record of accurate tax 
reporting. 
The requirement under APB 28 for companies to estimate annual ETR at each 
interim period is no easy task. The uncertainty, complex estimation, and substantial 
judgement create potential for significant estimation error in reported tax expense, a 
material expense for a broad set of firms. My study documents factors that are associated 
with interim tax reporting accuracy and demonstrates that accuracy has significant 
implications regarding investors’ use of tax expense, providing a contribution to the 
literature regarding the pricing of tax information reported in financial statements. 
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APPENDIX A 
FIGURE AND TABLES 
FIGURE 1 
Panel A: ETR Changes from Quarter 1 to Quarter 4 
 
 
Panel B: ETR Changes from Quarter 2 to Quarter 4 
 
 
Panel C: ETR Changes from Quarter 3 to Quarter 4 
 
Notes: This figure presents histograms for changes in ETR from 1st to 4th quarter, 2nd to 4th quarter, and 3rd 
to 4th quarter in Panel A, B, and C, respectively, for the full sample (n=13,509). 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
Sample Criteria Firm-years 
Firm-year observations from 2002 to 2013 available at the intersection 
of Compustat, Audit Analytics, IBES, and Thomson Reuters 
Institutional Holdings databases 
54,100 
Less: Financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 
codes 4900-4999) 
(12,327) 
Less: Observations with negative pretax income or ETR below zero or 
greater than one in any quarter 
(18,296) 
Less: Observations with assets less than 10 million (149) 
Less: Observations missing firm characteristic data (8,789) 
Less: Observations missing auditor characteristic data (228) 
Less: Observations missing analyst and institutional ownership data (802) 
Full Sample 13,509 
Notes: Appendix C provides definitions for variables used in analyses. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics: Determinants of Accuracy Sample 
N = 13,509 
Variable Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl 
ACCURACY1 -0.048 0.081 -0.052 -0.020 -0.006 
ACCURACY2 -0.038 0.070 -0.040 -0.015 -0.005 
ACCURACY3 -0.028 0.059 -0.026 -0.009 -0.003 
∆Q1Q4 -0.011 0.093 -0.029 -0.005 0.008 
∆Q2Q4 -0.008 0.079 -0.022 -0.004 0.006 
∆Q3Q4 -0.004 0.066 -0.013 -0.001 0.006 
SIZE 7.156 1.719 5.965 7.032 8.244 
GEO_SEGS 0.961 0.725 0.000 1.099 1.609 
BUS_SEGS 0.776 0.733 0.000 1.099 1.386 
∆MIX 0.125 0.246 0.000 0.012 0.114 
M&A 0.159 0.366 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R&D 0.035 0.058 0.000 0.005 0.049 
∆SALES 0.186 0.262 0.057 0.120 0.225 
EARN_VOL 1.239 3.305 0.318 0.566 1.078 
DISC_EXTRA 0.192 0.394 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DTA 0.019 0.082 -0.022 0.007 0.048 
EQUITY_COMP 0.017 0.020 0.003 0.007 0.022 
LEV 0.151 0.162 0.000 0.115 0.246 
ROA 0.081 0.058 0.041 0.068 0.107 
MTB 3.067 3.145 1.551 2.331 3.628 
ABACC -0.002 0.448 -0.067 0.002 0.084 
BIG4 0.868 0.338 1.000 1.000 1.000 
APTS 0.109 0.126 0.002 0.065 0.173 
EXPERT 0.424 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000 
TENURE 2.047 0.888 1.609 2.079 2.639 
OFFICE_SIZE 3.370 1.323 2.398 3.367 4.248 
AF 1.751 0.959 1.099 1.792 2.485 
EM 0.103 0.305 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IO 0.642 0.301 0.436 0.713 0.877 
SEC_TIER 0.067 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LNAUDFEES 13.969 1.221 13.205 13.921 14.708 
OPPORTUNITY 0.299 0.348 0.025 0.116 0.529 
EQINC 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CASH 0.220 0.252 0.045 0.132 0.309 
DEP 0.045 0.030 0.026 0.038 0.056 
PPE 0.283 0.261 0.095 0.199 0.383 
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the primary testing sample. 
Appendix C provides variable definitions.  
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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TABLE 3 
Panel A: First-Stage Model (Likelihood of Auditor-Provided Tax Services) 
DV = APTS_INDICATOR Coefficient (Standard Error) 
SIZE 0.074*** 
 (0.016) 
GEO_SEGS 0.141*** 
 (0.023) 
BUS_SEGS 0.018 
 (0.021) 
FOREIGN 0.090 
 (0.062) 
∆MIX 0.106*** 
 (0.041) 
M&A -0.277 
 (0.292) 
R&D -0.038 
 (0.052) 
∆SALES 0.012*** 
 (0.004) 
EARN_VOL 0.074*** 
 (0.016) 
DISC_EXTRA 0.060 
 (0.036) 
DTA 0.327* 
 (0.199) 
EQUITY_COMP -0.804 
 (0.743) 
LEV 0.040 
 (0.095) 
ROA -0.008 
 (0.274) 
MTB 0.015*** 
 (0.005) 
ABACC -0.047 
 (0.031) 
BIG4 0.027 
 (0.056) 
EXPERT 1.073*** 
 (0.034) 
TENURE 0.105*** 
 (0.016) 
OFFICE SIZE 0.018 
 (0.013) 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3 Panel A, Continued 
  
Variables Coefficient (Standard Error) 
AF -0.010 
 (0.021) 
EM -0.009 
 (0.042) 
IO 0.113** 
 (0.053) 
CASH 0.045 
 (0.069) 
DEP 0.418 
 (0.571) 
EQINC -9.330*** 
 (3.378) 
LNAUDFEES 0.144*** 
 (0.022) 
OPPORTUNITY -0.398*** 
 (0.053) 
PPE -0.151* 
 (0.081) 
SEC_TIER -0.171*** 
 (0.064) 
Constant -0.010 
 (0.021) 
  
Industry Fixed Effects YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES 
  
N 13,509 
Pseudo R-square 0.212 
Area under the ROC Curve 0.811 
  
Notes: This table present the results of estimating Equation (2), probability of 
purchasing auditor-provided tax services.  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively.  
p-values are two-tailed and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered 
by firm.  
Appendix C provides variable definitions. 
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TABLE 3 
Panel B: Determinants of Interim Tax Reporting Accuracy 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables ACCURACY1 ACCURACY2 ACCURACY3 
Market participants    
AF 0.002 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EM 0.004** 0.004** 0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
IO 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Auditor Characteristics   
BIG4 -0.003 0.001 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
APTS 0.009 0.008 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
EXPERT 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
TENURE 0.001 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
OFFICE_SIZE -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Firm Characteristics    
SIZE 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GEO_SEGS -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BUS_SEGS 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
∆MIX -0.052*** -0.044*** -0.034*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
M&A 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
R&D -0.142*** -0.109*** -0.082*** 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) 
∆SALES -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
EARN_VOL -0.001** -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DISC_EXTRA -0.007*** -0.004** -0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
DTA -0.046*** -0.031*** -0.025*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3 Panel B, Continued 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables ACCURACY1 ACCURACY2 ACCURACY3 
EQUITY_COMP -0.036 -0.083** -0.052* 
 (0.042) (0.037) (0.031) 
LEV -0.008 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
ROA 0.288*** 0.266*** 0.244*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) 
MTB -0.001** -0.000* -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ABACC -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
IMR -0.005 -0.008** -0.005* 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Constant -0.045*** -0.041*** -0.039*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
RHO 0.040 0.051* 0.035 
 (0.034) (0.027) (0.025) 
Wald χ2 p-value 0.242 0.055 0.168 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Log-Psuedo 
Likelihood 
9,771 11,765 13,929 
N 13,509 13,509 13,509 
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Equation (1). In Columns 1 – 3, the 
dependent variable is interim tax reporting accuracy for the first, second, and third 
quarters, (ACCURACY1, ACCURACY2, and ACCURACY3, respectively).  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. p-values are two-tailed and are calculated based on standard errors that 
are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010).  
Appendix C provides variable definitions. 
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TABLE 3 
Panel C: Determinants of Interim Tax Reporting Bias 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables ∆Q1Q4 ∆Q2Q4 ∆Q3Q4 
Market participants    
AF 0.001 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EM -0.001 -0.004** -0.005*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
IO -0.007* -0.011*** -0.007*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Auditor Characteristics   
BIG4 -0.002 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
APTS -0.006 -0.015** -0.009 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) 
EXPERT -0.002 -0.003 -0.003** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
TENURE 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
OFFICE_SIZE -0.001* 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm Characteristics    
SIZE 0.000 -0.001* -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GEO_SEGS -0.003 -0.003** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
BUS_SEGS -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
∆MIX -0.004 0.005 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
M&A 0.002 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
R&D -0.029 -0.018 -0.026* 
 (0.024) (0.019) (0.016) 
∆SALES 0.008** 0.005 0.004* 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
EARN_VOL -0.001* -0.001** -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DISC_EXTRA -0.006*** -0.003* -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
DTA -0.010 -0.002 -0.014 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) 
(Continued on next page) 
 64 
 
TABLE 3 Panel C, Continued 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables ∆Q1Q4 ∆Q2Q4 ∆Q3Q4 
EQUITY_COMP 0.052 0.034 0.015 
 (0.047) (0.041) (0.032) 
LEV -0.003 0.002 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
ROA -0.094*** -0.067*** -0.061*** 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.015) 
MTB 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ABACC -0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
 
IMR 0.001 0.006 0.008* 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) 
Constant 0.008 0.007 0.012** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
RHO 0.022 -0.022 -0.052 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.034) 
Wald χ2 p-value 0.679 0.670 0.123 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Log-Psuedo 
Likelihood 
7,058 9,279 11,793 
N 13,509 13,509 13,509 
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Equation (1). In Columns 1 – 3, the 
dependent variable is the change in ETR from the first, second, and third quarters 
(∆Q1Q4, ∆Q2Q4, ∆Q2Q4, respectively).  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. p-values are two-tailed and are calculated based on standard errors that 
are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010).  
Appendix C provides variable definitions. 
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TABLE 4 
Multinomial Logit: Positive and Negative ETR Surprises 
 (1) (2) 
Variables POS_SURPRISE NEG_SURPRISE 
Market participants   
AF 0.018 -0.127** 
 (0.065) (0.054) 
EM -0.372*** -0.030 
 (0.133) (0.106) 
IO -0.532*** -0.141 
 (0.163) (0.143) 
Auditor Characteristics   
BIG4 -0.213 -0.100 
 (0.142) (0.128) 
APTS -0.313 0.012 
 (0.372) (0.307) 
EXPERT 0.037 0.016 
 (0.090) (0.076) 
TENURE -0.030 -0.053 
 (0.055) (0.044) 
OFFICE_SIZE 0.060 0.071** 
 (0.039) (0.033) 
Firm Characteristics   
SIZE -0.113*** -0.047 
 (0.039) (0.033) 
GEO_SEGS 0.259*** 0.239*** 
 (0.075) (0.061) 
BUS_SEGS -0.007 0.033 
 (0.067) (0.054) 
∆MIX 0.880*** 0.907*** 
 (0.133) (0.117) 
M&A 0.038 -0.011 
 (0.106) (0.094) 
R&D 2.381*** 3.427*** 
 (0.841) (0.647) 
∆SALES 0.223 -0.052 
 (0.154) (0.147) 
EARN_VOL -0.002 0.021*** 
 (0.012) (0.007) 
DISC_EXTRA 0.142 0.253*** 
 (0.100) (0.086) 
DTA 0.798 2.411*** 
 (0.725) (0.541) 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 4, Continued 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variables POS_SURPRISE NEG_SURPRISE 
EQUITY_COMP 2.435 1.525 
 (2.424) (1.927) 
LEV 0.100 -0.235 
 (0.319) (0.263) 
ROA -31.454*** -13.461*** 
 (2.700) (1.298) 
MTB 0.056*** 0.002 
 (0.017) (0.016) 
ABACC 0.093 -0.109 
 (0.094) (0.069) 
Constant -1.573*** -2.646*** 
 (0.422) (0.340) 
   
Year Fixed Effects YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES 
   
N 13,509 
Wald Χ2 (p-value) < 0.01 
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating a multinomial logistic regression 
with positive and negative ETR surprises (POS_SURPRISE and NEG_SURPRISE, 
respectively) as the outcomes.  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. p-values are two-tailed and are calculated based on standard errors that 
are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010).  
Appendix C provides variable definitions. 
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TABLE 5 
Descriptive Statistics: Information Content Sample (n = 31,324) 
 
Variables 
Sig. 
Diff† 
 
Mean 
 
St Dev 
 
25th Pctl 
 
50th Pctl 
 
75th Pctl 
RETURN       
 Overall sample  0.114 0.777 -0.264 0.001 0.312 
 High accuracy firms n/s 0.107 0.586 -0.215 0.029 0.313 
 All other firms  0.116 0.827 -0.281 -0.007 0.312 
∆PTBI       
 Overall sample  0.008 0.114 -0.019 0.010 0.036 
 High accuracy firms n/s 0.008 0.071 -0.006 0.010 0.025 
 All other firms  0.008 0.124 -0.025 0.009 0.041 
∆TI       
 Overall sample  0.005 0.121 -0.023 0.005 0.034 
 High accuracy firms n/s 0.006 0.075 -0.012 0.007 0.026 
 All other firms  0.005 0.132 -0.028 0.005 0.038 
GAAP_ETR5       
 Overall sample  0.330 0.155 0.244 0.335 0.402 
 High accuracy firms HA<AO 0.325 0.112 0.280 0.342 0.387 
 All other firms  0.331 0.165 0.231 0.331 0.410 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for 31,324 firm-year observations from 
1993-2013. The “high accuracy firms” sample includes firm-years where prior ETR 
accuracy is in the top quartile (i.e., most accurate based on 3YR_ACCURACY), ranked 
by two-digit SIC industry and year. The “all other firms” sample includes the 
remaining firm-years. 
† Significant difference between high accuracy firms (“HA”) and all other firms 
(“AO”) based on t-test of means. High accuracy firms have significantly lower GAAP 
ETRs (p-value < 0.01) but not significantly different returns or changes in pretax book 
income or changes in taxable income.  
Appendix C provides variable definitions.  
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TABLE 6 
Information Content of Book and Estimated Taxable Income and the Role of Interim Tax Reporting Accuracy 
DV = RETURN Full Sample Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆PTBI 1.792*** 1.773*** 1.817*** 1.793*** 1.722*** 1.706*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.079) (0.079) (0.048) (0.048) 
∆TI 0.376*** 0.523*** 0.620*** 0.856*** 0.250*** 0.346*** 
 (0.040) (0.046) (0.082) (0.093) (0.043) (0.049) 
3YR_ACCURACY  -0.015  0.005  -0.031** 
  (0.011)  (0.021)  (0.013) 
∆TIx3YR_ACCURACY  0.695***  1.125***  0.456*** 
  (0.107)  (0.204)  (0.117) 
Constant 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
N 31,324 31,324 12,711 12,711 18,613 18,613 
R-squared 0.087 0.088 0.086 0.089 0.090 0.091 
Notes: This table presents the results of regressing contemporaneous returns (RETURN) on changes in pretax book income, 
estimated tax income, and the interaction of estimated taxable income and prior tax reporting accuracy (3YR_ACCURACY).  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. p-values are two-tailed and are 
calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010).  
Appendix C provides variable definitions. 
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TABLE 7 
Relative Information Content of Estimated Taxable Income and Book Income  
 
Panel A: Relative information content of estimated taxable income to book income for high and low tax accuracy 
firms (split at the median of 3YR_ACCURACY) 
 High Accuracy Firms (Median)  Low Accuracy Firms (Median) 
Year Obs ∆PTBI R2PTBI ∆TI R2TI R2TI/R2PTBI  Obs ∆PTBI R2PTBI ∆TI R2TI R2TI/R2PTBI 
Avg_Pre02 695 3.200 0.163 2.571 0.112 0.676  723 2.043 0.123 1.569 0.071 0.573 
Avg_Post02 764 2.463 0.131 1.302 0.057 0.533  795 2.280 0.140 0.909 0.031 0.213*** 
Avg_Total 731 2.814 0.146 1.907 0.083 0.601  761 2.168 0.132 1.223 0.050 0.384*** 
              
Panel B: Relative information content of estimated taxable income to book income for high accuracy firms (top 
quartile of 3YR_ACCURACY) and all other firms. 
 High Accuracy Firms (Top Quartile)  All Other Firms 
Year Obs ∆PTBI R2PTBI ∆TI R2TI R2TI/R2PTBI  Obs ∆PTBI R2PTBI ∆TI R2TI R2TI/R2PTBI 
Avg_Pre02 335 3.335 0.150 2.970 0.123 0.820  1,083 2.244 0.131 1.713 0.077 0.578** 
Avg_Post02 368 2.598 0.139 1.437 0.063 0.559  1,191 2.290 0.133 0.981 0.034 0.258*** 
Avg_Total 352 2.949 0.144 2.167 0.092 0.683  1,140 2.268 0.132 1.330 0.054 0.410*** 
              
Panel C: Relative information content of estimated taxable income to book income for low accuracy firms (lowest 
quartile of 3YR_ACCURACY) and all other firms. 
 Low Accuracy Firms (Lowest Quartile)  All Other Firms 
Year Obs ∆PTBI R2PTBI ∆TI R2TI R2TI/R2PTBI  Obs ∆PTBI R2PTBI ∆TI R2TI R2TI/R2PTBI 
Avg_Pre02 347 1.715 0.116 1.207 0.056 0.520  1,071 2.835 0.149 2.332 0.102 0.672* 
Avg_Post02 380 2.014 0.134 0.644 0.028 0.206  1,178 2.612 0.136 1.286 0.045 0.331** 
Avg_Total 365 1.871 0.125 0.912 0.041 0.356  1,127 2.718 0.142 1.784 0.072 0.493** 
              
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 7, Continued 
 
Panel D: Relative information content of estimated taxable income to book income for high and low tax accuracy 
firms (split at the median of 3YR_ACCURACY) for a sample of firms matched on level of tax planning (based on 
GAAP_ETR5) 
 
 High Accuracy Firms (Median)  Low Accuracy Firms (Median) 
Year Obs ∆PTBI R2PTBI ∆TI R2TI R2TI/R2PTBI  Obs ∆PTBI R2PTBI ∆TI R2TI R2TI/R2PTBI 
Avg_Pre02 610 3.519 0.175 3.116 0.142 0.778  610 2.483 0.143 1.858 0.082 0.592* 
Avg_Post02 648 2.549 0.133 1.503 0.071 0.844  648 1.786 0.126 0.827 0.043 0.366** 
Avg_Total 632 2.990 0.152 2.236 0.103 0.814  632 2.103 0.134 1.296 0.061 0.469*** 
Notes:  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. p-values are based on one-
tailed t-tests and computed using the yearly values of R2TI/R
2
PTBI for high accuracy firms versus low accuracy firms. 
Inferences are unchanged if using Wilcoxon rank sum tests to calculate p-values.  
Appendix C provides variable definitions. 
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TABLE 8 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Earnings Announcement for Firms that 
Beat Analysts’ Forecast Target 
DV = CAR (1) (2) 
Intercept 0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Beat_w_Tax -0.004***  
 (0.001)  
Beat_w_Tax_Accurate  -0.001 
  (0.003) 
Beat_w_Tax_Inaccurate  -0.005*** 
  (0.002) 
AFE 9.136*** 9.148*** 
 (0.457) (0.457) 
BTM 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
SIZE -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
MOMENTUM -0.075*** -0.075*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
   
N 18,223 18,223 
R2 0.029 0.029 
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Equation (4). *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. p-values 
are two-tailed and are calculated based on standard errors that are clustered by firm 
(Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010).  
Appendix C provides variable definitions. 
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TABLE 9 
De-Biased Accuracy Measure 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables ACC1_debiased ACC2_debiased ACC3_debiased 
Market participants   
AF 0.001 0.002** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EM 0.004* 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
IO 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Auditor Characteristics   
BIG4 -0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
APTS 0.009 0.003 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
EXPERT 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
TENURE 0.001 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
OFFICE_SIZE -0.001** -0.000 -0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Characteristics   
SIZE 0.003*** 0.001** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
GEO_SEGS -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BUS_SEGS 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
∆MIX -0.052*** -0.044*** -0.033*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
M&A 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
R&D -0.140*** -0.109*** -0.086*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) 
∆SALES -0.006** -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
EARN_VOL -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DISC_EXTRA -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.002** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
DTA -0.042*** -0.031*** -0.026*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 9, Continued 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables ACC1_debiased ACC2_debiased ACC3_debiased 
EQUITY_COMP -0.035 -0.088*** -0.055** 
 (0.036) (0.031) (0.027) 
LEV -0.008* -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
ROA 0.264*** 0.243*** 0.223*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) 
MTB -0.001*** -0.000** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ABACC -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.047*** -0.040*** -0.038*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
    
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
YES YES YES 
R2 0.114 0.110 0.106 
N 13,509 13,509 13,509 
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Equation (1) after replacing the 
dependent variable with de-biased accuracy as the dependent variable.  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. p-values are two-tailed and are calculated based on standard errors that 
are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010).  
Appendix C provides variable definitions. 
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APPENDIX B 
INTERIM ETR ESTIMATE EXAMPLE 
Suppose a firm has operations in the U.S. and a foreign subsidiary with statutory tax rates of 35 percent 
and 25 percent, respectively.1 The firm also has significant R&D expenditures, for which it anticipates a 
tax credit. For each interim period, the firm should calculate its tax expense using the integral method as 
follows: 
In Q1, the firm projects annual pretax income of $100 in both the U.S. and its foreign subsidiary for a total 
of $200 annual pretax income. It also projects an R&D tax credit of $2 at the end of the year. Therefore, 
the firm projects $35 U.S. tax ($100 x 35%), $25 foreign tax ($100 x 25%), and a tax credit of $2 for a 
total tax expense of $58 ($35 + $25 - $2) for the year. The projected annual ETR as of Q1 is therefore 29% 
($58 tax expense / $200 pre-tax income).  
If the firm reports actual total pre-tax income in Q1 of $75, the firm accrues $21.75 ($75 x 29%) tax 
expense in Q1. Note that $75 is not proportional to projected annual pre-tax income and $21.75 is not 
proportional to projected total tax expense; the tax expense accrued should reflect projected ETR at the 
end of the year, so is applied to each quarter on a pro rata basis. The following table summarizes this 
calculation: 
Q1 Projection: Pretax Income Tax Rate Tax 
U.S. $100 35% $35 
Foreign $100 25% $25 
Tax Credit $(2) 
Total Tax Expense $58 
Projected ETR 29% 
Q1 actual pretax income $75 
Apply projected ETR 29% 
Q1 tax expense $21.75 
In Q2, the firm projects annual pretax income of $200, however, now $130 is projected in the U.S. and 
$70 is projected in the foreign jurisdiction. The projected R&D tax credit remains $2. Therefore, the 
projected tax rate in Q2 is 30.5% ((($130x35%) + ($70x25%)-$2)/$200). If the firm reports year-to-date 
pre-tax income in Q2 of $120, year-to-date tax expense should be $36.60 ($120x30.5%) to reflect the 
projected annual ETR. Because $21.75 of tax expense was accrued in Q1, the Q2 tax expense is $14.85 
($36.60 - $21.75). The following table summarizes this calculation: 
Q2 Projection: Pretax Income Tax Rate Tax 
U.S. $130 35% $45.5 
Foreign $70 25% $17.5 
Tax Credit $(2) 
Total Tax Expense $61 
Projected ETR 30.5% 
Q2 year-to-date pretax income $120 
Apply projected ETR 30.5% 
Year-to-date tax expense $36.60 
Less Q1 tax expense accrued $21.75 
Q2 tax expense $14.85 
A1 Note that under ASC 740-30-25-17 (formerly APB 23), when firms designate unremitted foreign earnings as permanently or 
indefinitely reinvested, they are not required to accrue deferred tax expense on those earnings. 
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In Q3, the firm does not change its projected U.S. or foreign pre-tax income. However, the firm anticipates 
an increase in the R&D credit to $4. Therefore, the projected tax rate in Q3 is 29.5%. If the firm reports 
year-to-date pre-tax income in Q3 of $160, year-to-date tax expense should be $47.20 to reflect the 
projected annual ETR. Because $36.60 was accrued through Q2, the Q3 tax expense is $10.60. The 
following table summarizes this calculation: 
Q3 Projection: Pretax Income Tax Rate Tax 
U.S. $130 35% $45.5 
Foreign $70 25% $17.5 
  Tax Credit $(4) 
  Total Tax Expense $59 
  Projected ETR 29.5% 
Q3 year-to-date pretax income $160   
Apply projected ETR 29.5%   
Year-to-date tax expense $47.20   
Less tax expense accrued $36.60   
Q3 tax expense $10.60   
 
In Q4, the firm realizes its total annual income of $180, with $110 in the U.S. and $70 in the foreign 
jurisdiction. The R&D credit is anticipated to be $4 when the tax return is filed. Therefore, the tax rate at 
year end is 28.89% and total tax expense is $52. Because $47.2 of tax expense was accrued in Q1-Q3, tax 
expense for the fourth quarter is $4.80 to reflect annual tax expense. The following table summarizes this 
calculation: 
Q4: Pretax Income Tax Rate Tax 
U.S. $110 35% $38.5 
Foreign $70 25% $17.5 
  Tax Credit $(4) 
  Total Tax Expense $52 
  ETR 28.89% 
Annual pretax income $180   
Apply projected ETR 28.89%   
Year-to-date tax expense $52   
Less tax expense accrued $47.20   
Q4 tax expense $4.80   
 
The interim ETR estimates are summarized as follows: 
Quarter Estimated ETR 
Change from Prior 
Quarter 
Difference from 
annual 
EPS effect (compared 
to prior ETR 
estimate) 
1 29.00 - +0.11  
2 30.50 +1.50 +1.61 -2.11% 
3 29.50 -1.00 +0.61 +1.44% 
4 28.89 -0.61 - +0.86% 
 
The EPS effect is calculated by dividing the change from prior quarter by (1-prior quarter ETR estimate). 
For example, if the quarter’s pre-tax earnings was $10, after-tax EPS is $7.10 (10x(1-0.290)) using the Q1 
ETR estimate; however, using the second quarter ETR estimate, after-tax EPS is $6.95 (10x(1-0.305)), a 
decrease of 2.11%. 
 
In this example, the firm has relatively accurate ETR estimates compared to those in my sample; however, 
note that even relatively small changes in ETR have a significant effect on after-tax EPS.  
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APPENDIX C 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Primary dependent variables 
ACCURACY1 Absolute value of the difference between the year-to-date ETR in the 
first quarter and the year-end ETR, multiplied by negative one.  
ACCURACY2 Absolute value of the difference between the year-to-date ETR in the 
second quarter and the year-end ETR, multiplied by negative one.  
ACCURACY3 Absolute value of the difference between the year-to-date ETR in the 
third quarter and the year-end ETR, multiplied by negative one.  
∆Q1Q4 Year-end ETR minus year-to-date ETR in the first quarter.  
∆Q2Q4 Year-end ETR minus year-to-date ETR in the second quarter.  
∆Q3Q4 Year-end ETR minus year-to-date ETR in the second quarter.  
ACC1_debiased Absolute value of the de-biased ∆Q1Q4, multiplied by negative one. 
The de-biased ∆Q1Q4 is the actual ∆Q1Q4 minus the predicted bias 
based on coefficient estimates of a regression of ∆Q1Q4 on variables 
included in Equation (1). 
ACC2_debiased Absolute value of the de-biased ∆Q2Q4, multiplied by negative one. 
The de-biased ∆Q1Q4 is the actual ∆Q2Q4 minus the predicted bias 
based on coefficient estimates of a regression of ∆Q2Q4 on variables 
included in Equation (1). 
ACC3_debiased Absolute value of the de-biased ∆Q3Q4, multiplied by negative one. 
The de-biased ∆Q1Q4 is the actual ∆Q3Q4 minus the predicted bias 
based on coefficient estimates of a regression of ∆Q3Q4 on variables 
included in Equation (1). 
Firm characteristics 
ABACC Abnormal accruals for year t based on the performance-adjusted 
modified Jones Model (Kothari et al. 2005). 
BUS_SEG Natural log of the number of business segments of the company. 
DISC_EXTRA Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has non-zero discontinued 
operations (Compustat DO) or extraordinary items (Compustat XI) 
during the year, zero otherwise. 
DTA Total net deferred tax assets at the beginning of the year (Compustat 
TXNDB) scaled by lagged total assets (Compustat AT). 
EARN_VOL Standard deviation of earnings per share over the prior five years 
scaled by total assets. 
EQUITY_COMP Stock compensation expense (Compustat STKCO) scaled by total 
sales (Compustat SALE) 
GEO_SEG Natural log of the number of geographic segments of the company. 
∆SALES Sales growth, measured as the absolute value of: sales in year t less 
sales in year t-1, scaled by sales in year t-1. 
LEV Long-term-debt-to-asset ratio at the end of year t (DLTT) scaled by 
total assets at the end of the year (Compustat AT). 
M&A Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm participated in any merger and 
acquisition activity during year t; 0 otherwise. Merger and acquisition 
activity is determined based on non-zero acquisition expense (AQP). 
∆MIX Change in geographic mix of income, measured as the absolute value 
of: foreign pretax income (Compustat PIFO) divided by total pretax 
income (Compustat PI) in year t minus foreign pretax income divided 
by total pretax income in year t-1. 
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MTB Market-to-book ratio for the end of year t, measured as market value 
of equity (PRCC_F x CSHO) divided by book value of equity (CEQ). 
PERM_DIFF Absolute value of year-end GAAP ETR (Compustat TXT divided by 
PI) minus 0.35. 
R&D R&D expense for year t (XRD) scaled by total assets at the beginning 
of the year (AT). 
ROA Return on assets for year t, measured as the ratio of pre-tax income 
(PI) to the average of total assets for the year (AT). 
SIZE Natural log of market value of equity for the company at the 
beginning of year t. 
Auditor characteristics 
APTS Tax fees divided by total fees paid to the auditor 
BIG4 Indicator variable equal to 1 if audited by a Big 4 firm; 0 otherwise. 
OFFICE_SIZE Natural log of the number of clients audited by the office in year t. 
EXPERT Indicator variable equal to 1 if an audit firm is both an audit and tax 
expert; 0 otherwise. Audit and tax expertise follows McGuire, Omer, 
and Wang (2012). An audit office is defined as an industry audit (tax) 
expert if its market share in a given MSA (city) and industry (two-
digit SIC) is greater than or equal to 30 percent. Market share is 
defined as total audit (tax) fees paid to the audit firm divided by total 
audit (tax) fees paid to all other audit firms in the same industry and 
MSA. 
AUDIT_EXPERT Indicator variable equal to 1 if an audit firm is an audit expert; 0 
otherwise. Audit expertise follows McGuire, Omer, and Wang 
(2012).  
TAX_EXPERT Indicator variable equal to 1 if an audit firm is a tax expert; 0 
otherwise. Tax expertise follows McGuire, Omer, and Wang (2012).  
TENURE Natural log of the number of years the audit firm audited the client. 
Analyst-related variables 
AF Natural log of the number of analysts following the company in the 
year t. 
EM Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company would have missed the 
last consensus analyst forecast using the previous quarter’s ETR 
within five cents; zero otherwise.  
Institutional ownership variable 
IO Percentage of shares owned by institutions at the beginning of the 
year. 
Additional variables for self-selection correction 
CASH Cash holding at the end of year t (CHE) scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of year (AT). 
DEP Depreciation and amortization expense for year t (DP) divided by 
total assets at the beginning of the year (AT). 
EQINC Equity income for year t (ESUB) scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the year (AT). 
IMR Inverse Mills ratio calculated based on the coefficient estimates from 
Equation (2). 
LNAUDFEES Natural log of audit fees received from the client. 
OPPORTUNITY Market value of a client divided by the sum of the market value of all 
clients in the same industry at the same MSA city. 
PPE Net PPE for year t (PPENT) scaled by total assets at the beginning of 
the year (AT). 
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SEC_TIER Indicator variable equal to 1 if audited by a second-tier accounting 
firm, namely, Grant Thornton LLP and BDO Seidman LLP; 0 
otherwise. 
Variables for market response tests 
RETURN Buy-and-hold market-adjusted (value-weighted) return for security j 
over the 16-month return window starting at the beginning of fiscal 
year t and ending 4 months after the end of fiscal year t. 
∆PTBI Change in pretax book income (PTBI) from year t-1 to year t, scaled 
by market value of equity (MVE) at beginning of year t. PTBI is 
computed as pretax book income (Compustat PI) less minority 
interest (Compustat MII). MVE is computed as Compustat PRCC_F 
x CSHO.  
∆TI Change in estimated taxable income (TI) from year t-1 to year t, 
scaled by market value of equity (MVE) at beginning of year t. TI is 
computed as [(FTE + FOTE)/0.35] - ∆NOL, where FTE is current 
federal income tax expense (Compustat TXFED), FOTE is current 
foreign tax expense (Compustat TXFO), 0.35 is the top U.S. statutory 
tax rate for the sample period (1993 and later), and ∆NOL is change 
in net operating loss carryforwards (Compustat TLCF). MVE is 
computed as Compustat PRCC_F x CSHO. If federal income tax 
expense is missing from Compustat, TI is estimated as the difference 
between total income tax expense (Compustat TXT) and deferred 
taxes (Compustat TXDI) divided by 0.35, less the change in NOL 
carryforwards.  
3YR_ACCURACY Annual quartile rank by 2-digit SIC of prior three year tax reporting 
accuracy (year t-3 to t-1), scaled to range between -0.5 and -0.5. Prior 
reporting accuracy is computed as the sum of the absolute value of 
the differences between year-end ETR and estimated ETR in quarters 
1, 2, and 3 over the prior three years. There are three differences each 
year, so cumulative three year tax reporting accuracy is based on nine 
differences. The sum is multiplied by negative one so higher values 
indicate greater accuracy, and those values are ranked into quartiles 
and ranks are then scaled to range between -0.5 and 0.5. 
GAAP_ETR5 Accumulated GAAP ETR over prior five years, calculated as the sum 
of current tax expense (Compustat TXT less TXDI) over the prior 
five years (years t-4 to year t) divided by the pretax book income 
(Compustat PI) over the prior five years.  
CAR Cumulative return for the five-day window around the earnings 
announcement (day -2 to day +2) minus the cumulative return for an 
equal-weighted portfolio of firms in the same CRSP size decile. 
BEAT_W_TAX Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm would have missed analysts’ 
forecast without a change in ETR from quarter 3 to quarter 4, zero 
otherwise. 
BEAT_W_TAX_ACCURATE Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm would have missed analysts’ 
forecast without a change in ETR from quarter 3 to quarter 4 and the 
firms’ prior 3YR_ACCURACY is above the median, zero otherwise. 
BEAT_W_TAX_INACCURATE Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm would have missed analysts’ 
forecast without a change in ETR from quarter 3 to quarter 4 and the 
firms’ prior 3YR_ACCURACY is below the median, zero otherwise. 
AFE Actual earnings per share reported by I/B/E/S minus the last I/B/E/S 
consensus forecast, divided by stock price at the end of the fiscal 
year. 
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BTM Book-to-market ratio, measured as book value of equity (CEQ) 
divided by market value of equity (PRCC_F x CSHO). 
SIZE Natural log of total assets at the end of the year. 
MOMENTUM Cumulative size-adjusted returns for the six months prior to the 
earnings announcement, ending three days before the earnings 
announcement. 
 
